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Agreeing and Implementing the Doha Round of the WTO. Edited by Harald 
Hohmann. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008.  Pp. x, 
504 ISBN978-0-521-86990-4. UK£70.00; US$126.00 
 
Agreeing and Implementing the Doha Round of the WTO is one of the 
first scholarly works produced to assess the progress of the Doha Round of 
negotiations under the World Trade Organization.  This collection of essays 
includes contributions by scholars and practitioners alike from Europe, 
America, and Asia, and attempts to balance views from both developed and 
developing nations.  The aim of the volume is to lay out what has happened in 
the Doha Round of negotiations so far, to assess the progress of discussions, 
and to analyze their importance for the future development of world trade law.  
The book is divided into four parts, each addressing a particular issue.  
The first part of the book contains essays on development policy, with two 
chapters devoted to examining this issue from a European Union perspective 
and a “developing nation” perspective.  Part one also includes an article on 
the need for domestic policy development, in conjunction with trade 
liberalization, in order to eradicate poverty.  The final article discusses the 
WTO dispute settlement system as a body for implementing the special and 
differential principle.  
Part two addresses the issue of trade policy, including articles 
assessing what has been achieved so far with the Doha Round and what the 
future of the talks hold.  Part two also includes essays on competition law and 
how it could be dealt with outside the WTO framework, the interaction 
between liberal globalism and socio-economic and human rights, and the 
chemical industry’s views on the progress made in the Doha Round.  Part 
three examines the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, looking at its history 
and its present incarnation and also includes chapters that discuss the 
competence of WTO panels in relation to environmental issues and the role of 
legal aid in the WTO dispute settlement process. 
Part four examines trade in relation to health, the environment, and 
social standards. Essays discuss human rights, labor standards, and a possible 
climate change regime under the WTO.  This part also includes articles 
examining the relationship between free trade and the environment and the 
WTO measures which may provide protection in the realm of food and health 
safety.   A final chapter is devoted to the conclusions of the editor. 
This book provides an excellent survey of some important issues 
surrounding the Doha talks.  Of particular interest are chapters that provide 
the perspectives of both developed and developing countries on the same 
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issue.  There are several chapters that provide an excellent history of certain 
aspects of WTO development as well as the progress of certain issues through 
the Doha Round of discussions.  To a scholar familiar with the basics of the 
WTO and its negotiations, this book provides excellent detail. 
However, this book is not for someone new to the scholarship of international 
trade issues, in general, or the WTO, in particular.  Articles provide very little 
in the way of introduction to the WTO, its institutions, and its processes.   
Many articles assume a basic familiarity with the jargon and issues of 
international trade policy.  Readers without this background may find 
themselves looking for a primer on the subject in order to be able to 
appreciate the substance of the book. 
Overall, this book is a useful addition to an international trade policy 
collection.  It provides essays on a broad range of topics and from a variety of 
perspectives. While potentially overwhelming for a person beginning their 
studies on the WTO, it provides excellent detail and discussion for the 
advanced scholar. Although it suffers from some organizational and editorial 
issues, the book provides a great deal of interesting and relevant information 
on the topic of the WTO and the Doha negotiations. 
 
Alissa Black-Dorward 
Reference Librarian 
Fordham University School of Law 
Leo T. Kissam Memorial Library 
New York, NY USA 
 
 
The Principality of Monaco: State, International Status, Institutions. By 
Georges Grinda. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007. 
Pp. xx, 208. ISBN: 978-9-067-04219-2. UK£38.00; US$75.00 
 
The Principality of Monaco is a small independent city-state 
surrounded by France on three sides and the Mediterranean Sea to the south.  
Monaco has a rich legal and political history.  It is a constitutional monarchy 
and principality that has been ruled by the Grimaldi family since 1297; the 
State's sovereignty was officially recognized by the Franco-Monegasque 
Treaty of 1861.  The genesis of this book is the 2002 revision of Monaco's 
constitution and the Franco-Monegasque Treaty of 24 October 2002.  These 
two events reinforced the Principality’s statehood by resolving issues of 
sovereignty and the risk of a vacancy on the throne.  Under the constitutional 
revisions, approved by the treaty, only a member of the Grimaldi line can 
assume the throne, thereby resolving concerns that Monaco could potentially 
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become a French protectorate.  This book is in some ways a celebration of 
these two events, but it is also much more.   
The Principality of Monaco: State, International Status, Institutions is 
an English translation of the 2005 book by Georges Grinda entitled La 
Principauté de Monaco: l'Etat, son StatutIinternational, ses Institutions.  The 
author focuses his analysis on Monaco’s constitution, but also discusses the 
monarchy, government, National Council, Crown Council, State Council, 
legislative system, and courts.  In this, his fifth book on the government of 
Monaco, Grinda presents an analysis of the nature of government in Monaco 
from the perspective of an experienced insider.   
Grinda begins each chapter of this highly accessible book with an 
introduction to the topic that situates it both historically and within the local 
contemporary culture.  As the Plenipotentiary Minister of European Affairs 
for Monaco, Grinda has had personal experience with Monaco’s interaction 
with regional European governmental institutions.  In this book, Grinda 
assumes the role of cultural ambassador, explaining the vagaries of the unique 
city-nation state of Monaco.  Grinda’s diplomatic experience lends an 
important and distinctive perspective and may be why this book is not exactly 
what a reader might initially expect.   
This book differs in key ways from traditional introductions to the 
law of a country such as French Legal System (2nd edition, 2006) by 
Catherine Elliott, Eric Jeanpierre, and Catherine Vernon or Introduction to 
French Law (2008) edited by George A. Bermann and Etienne Picard.  The 
typical introduction to a foreign legal system has sections on civil procedure, 
criminal procedure, and other practice-oriented legal topics. By contrast and 
as implied by the full title, The Principality of Monaco: State, International 
Status, Institutions, this book focuses on governmental structure, international 
relations, and institutions instead of systematically covering legal issues by 
type of law.  
Although it is not a legal research guide, it is a valuable tool for 
researchers searching for legal and political information on Monaco.
1  Currently, there are not many legal research guides that focus on 
Monaco, and even fewer are in English.  Perhaps the most comprehensive 
online guide is the “Monaco” chapter in the Foreign Law Guide by Thomas 
 
 
                                                 
1 The best source of recent Monegasque law such as codes and the official gazette 
is probably the official government website at http://www.monaco.gouv.mc or Legi 
Monaco Juris at http://www.legimonaco.mc.   
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Reynolds and Arturo Flores.2  While Reynolds and Flores provide a subject-
by-subject listing of the sources of Monegasque law, Grinda instead focuses 
on the intersection of law and government.  
Researchers will find that this book incorporates background 
information about the political structure into a textured analysis of the 
functioning of the state.  They should not expect a list of basic political facts 
such as those found in the annual Political Handbook of the World or The 
Statesman’s Yearbook.  Similarly, The Principality of Monaco: State, 
International Status, Institutions addresses Monaco’s constitution without 
being an annotated constitution such as Lumb & Moens' The Constitution of 
the Commonwealth of Australia Annotated (7th edition, 2007), by Gabriël A. 
Moens and John Trone.    
Because Grinda’s book includes features from various types of 
publications, it can be a reference to researchers who want to know where to 
find certain types of legal and government information about Monaco.  
Grinda discusses the history, function, and status of the Monegasque State.  
He provides an excellent overview of the constitution, important treaties, 
government structure, origins of the State, and Monaco’s status in the 
international community.  The book contains extensive citations to source 
documents, and following the three page bibliography, there is a section 
entitled “Documentation,” which provides a brief annotated list of official 
sources and where to find them.  As annexes to the book, the author provides 
the full-text to both the Constitution of the Principality of Monaco and the 
Franco-Monegasque Treaty of 24 October 2002 in English translation.  
The Principality of Monaco: State, International Status, Institutions is a good 
choice for those interested in the legal history of Monaco, the international 
status of Monaco, the constitution of Monaco, or the structure of Monaco’s 
government.  While a researcher could find some of this information in other 
publications and web sites, this book provides a unique insider perspective on 
Monaco’s place in the international community.  It is a well-suited choice for 
a college, university, or law school library. 
 
Catherine Deane & Vincent Moyer 
Foreign, Comparative & International Law Department 
Hastings College of the Law Library 
San Francisco, CA USA 
                                                 
2 The Foreign Law Guide at http://www.foreignlawguide.com is a subscription 
service.  An extensive search also yielded the basic Library of Congress legal 
research guide to Monaco at http://www.loc.gov/law/help/guide/nations/monaco.php 
and an LLRX guide to the micro-states at http://www.llrx.com/features/microstates-
.htm#Monaco. 
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The Prohibition of Propaganda for War in International Law.  By Michael 
G. Kearney.  Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.  Pp. xiii, 
274.  ISBN: 978-0-19-923245-1. UK£60.00; US$145.00. 
 
Kearney’s book is a self-described effort to move the prohibition of 
propaganda for war from the footnotes of academic literature to the forefront 
of international law discourse.  To this end, Kearney seeks to provide the 
“comprehensive analysis” he asserts is missing from, and necessary to, a full 
understanding of the meaning and scope of such a prohibition’s proper 
position in international law.  Creating accountability, he asserts, is the next 
logical step in the development of international law and a necessary measure 
in the prevention of war.  His efforts have produced a book that is a valuable 
perspective on an issue that has been marginalized for far too long. 
While clearly passionate about his topic, Kearney constructs his 
argument with a composure that underscores his points with intellect rather 
than emotion.  His analysis is sound and supported by extensive footnotes that 
connect the reader to multiple sources of law drawn from history and the 
present that, true to the traditional process of the development of international 
law, establish evidence of international standards which, Kearney argues, 
should be codified by the International Law Commission to recognize a 
prohibition of propaganda for war, or, at least, a crime of incitement to 
aggression.  The norms, according to Kearney, have generally been adequate; 
the problem is that they have not been enforced.  Kearney provides a history 
lesson in the international development of the prohibition of propaganda for 
war in which he focuses not only on the more obvious sources, such as 
treaties, non-governmental resolutions, and resolutions of the League of 
Nations, but also places a strong emphasis on the analysis used by national 
and international criminal tribunals to address the issue of propaganda’s 
contribution to the wrongs they seek to redress.  This collective jurisprudence 
in fact becomes the mortar of his argument that a prohibition against 
propaganda for war, although not yet clear precedent, is by analogy already 
firmly entrenched in an important part of the international legal community.  
Kearney also examines the goal of those who established the International 
Military Tribunal and notes that it explicitly created accountability not only 
for those responsible for the events of the time, but also for those whose 
actions [propaganda] created an environment in which such events were 
possible.    
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Kearney also looks to the General Assembly of the United Nations for 
evidence of recurring resolutions and declarations that, he argues, established 
an obligation on the part of states to abstain from the use of propaganda for 
war.  Kearney thereby seeks to establish a custom of condemning propaganda 
for war through the resolutions and declarations of the General Assembly of 
the United Nations.  He acknowledges that the persistent hesitation on the part 
of Western democracies, together with the 1976 adoption of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights by the General Assembly and the end 
of the Cold War, eventually led to the end of the passage of resolutions 
addressing propaganda for war. However, he states this is evidence that the 
Assembly apparently considered the Covenant sufficient to address the issue.  
Kearney agrees that Article 20(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights is the most significant provision dealing with propaganda for 
war in international human rights law, and herein lies the heart of the book.  
He discusses its perceived weaknesses, the primary two of which are the lack 
of a definition of propaganda for war and the perceived threat to freedom of 
expression.  He disposes of the matter of risk to freedom of expression by not 
only pointing out that is a freedom that is expressly protected by the 
convention, but also by drawing a distinction between individual speech and 
governmental speech.  He ultimately identifies the two rights as 
complementary to each other, rather than in contradiction with one another, as 
a result of the greater individual freedoms that result from judicious 
enforcement of such a prohibition.   
The lack of a definition of propaganda for war requires more of his 
attention and, even after his thorough analysis, remains an unresolved issue. 
However, he can be forgiven for this because his purpose is not to pin down 
definitions for terms such as “propaganda” and “war,” but rather to provide an 
understanding of each within the context of the phrase “propaganda for war,” 
and this he does well.  Kearney is not content to accept the position of the 
delegates in support of Article 20(1), some of whom were satisfied with the 
notion, “I’ll know it when I see it.”  He instead examines the issue in more 
detail, drawing on the debates to identify the two distinct elements of 
propaganda for war as “incitement to war” and “the repeated and insistent 
expression of an opinion for the purpose of creating a climate of hatred and 
lack of understanding between the peoples of two or more countries, in order 
to bring them eventually to armed conflict.”   
In his analysis of the years that ensued after the passage of Article 
20(1), Kearney reviews how individual nations have interpreted and applied 
the prohibition of propaganda for war and, in doing so, reaches two 
conclusions.  First, he confirms his conclusion that a prohibition of 
propaganda for war is not a violation of the right to freedom of expression.  
Second, he rejects the notion that there are inadequate resources to which 
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nations may turn for an appropriate definition of propaganda for war.  In fact, 
he asserts, the failure of states to define the term precisely is a violation of the 
obligation of nations to observe international law and serves to misinterpret 
and misapply the Article, which in turn leads to “an intolerable undermining 
of the entire international human rights framework.”   
Ultimately, Kearney argues, the difficulties in pinning down a 
definition should not stop us from moving forward with developing a 
resolution to the issue.  Specifically, Kearney proposes, there should be 
included “a distinct crime of direct and public incitement to aggression in the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.”  His proposition, while 
politically provocative, is timely and therefore relevant and deserving of our 
close attention.  Kearney presents this as an “opportunity for the 
reinvigoration of the principal at hand.”  His assertion is based upon the 
premise that if an act is illegal under international law, then so is “incitement 
intended and likely to lead to that act.”   Kearney supports this principle with 
several examples in both international and state law.    
Kearney makes the logical point that even if he is unsuccessful in 
what he advocates, the issue will continue to be raised for review in the 
International Criminal Court.  He advocates enforcement of violations of the 
prohibition through the International Court of Justice as a forum for hearing 
cases which, he feels, the Human Rights Committee has neglected to address, 
and additionally states the necessity for state legislation giving effect to 
Article 20(1) of the Covenant.   
Kearney is successful in his goal that the book will stimulate 
discussion among its readers.   There is no doubt that it will do so; it is a 
significant contribution to this debate and could serve as a valuable resource 
for the leaders of our country.  Whether it will contribute to the future 
development of international law remains to be seen.  Regardless, the text of 
his book, together with the supporting (and sometimes contrasting) footnotes 
and extensive bibliography, combine to create a comprehensive source of all 
of the international laws relevant to a discussion of prohibition of propaganda 
for war in international law, and the book is therefore additionally successful 
as an important reference tool for those seeking an outline of the scope of the 
prohibition in the international law context.   As an aside, readers will also 
find it interesting to read about Kearney’s brief review of the history and 
techniques of propaganda for war, including the exploitation of emotion and 
intellect through the selective presentation of information and the use of  
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persuasion.  His analysis serves to inform us not just as academics but also as 
voters and conscientious citizens. 
 
Amy Emerson 
Research Attorney 
Cornell Law Library 
Ithaca, NY USA 
 
 
Finding Solutions for Environmental Conflicts: Power and Negotiation. By 
Edward Christie. Cheltenham, UK; Northhampton, MA; Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2008. Pp. xvii, 335. ISBN 978-1-84720-070-9. UK£75.00; 
US$140.00 
 
 Written as part of the New Horizons in Environmental Law Series, 
Edward Christie’s Finding Solutions for Environmental Conflicts: Power and 
Negotiation presents an analysis of how to use alternative dispute resolution 
(ADR) to settle environmental conflicts. In the introductory chapter, the 
author reviews the history of environmental law and chronicles the 
development and structure of ADR. There is an analysis of how the litigation 
and ADR approaches will differ in how they solve environmental conflicts. In 
his initial comparison between ADR and litigation, Mr. Christie states, in 
litigation, “judges adjudicate on disputes and impose a binding decision on 
the parties” while in ADR, “the dispute resolver’s role is to assist the parties 
to resolve their conflict by finding their own solution through a negotiated 
agreement.” This chapter also sets the stage for the rest of the book by 
explaining the reasons why ADR should be considered in environmental 
conflicts. 
  Following the introduction, Mr. Christie structures the book into three 
parts. The first part discusses environmental decision-making, enforcement of 
environmental legislation, and public participation, and shows how the United 
States, United Kingdom, and Australia each have addressed the relevant 
issues in legislation, regulations, and case law. Chapter two explores the 
cross-disciplinary aspects of environmental conflicts, including traditional 
questions of law and scientific findings that affect decisions in such conflicts. 
Knowledge power, which is the concept that understanding the legal or 
scientific facts for a particular conflict gives a participant a level of power in 
settling the conflict, is introduced in this chapter and discussed in further 
detail in subsequent chapters. In chapter three, the author discusses aspects of 
participation in environmental conflicts and how the different countries have 
responded to either encourage or discourage public participation. It explores 
concepts such as knowledge of indigenous peoples and freedom of 
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information legislation and how they affect participation. The last chapter in 
this part provides a detailed analysis of the enforcement of environmental 
laws in the three countries and how the enforcement can impact moving from 
a litigation model to a negotiation or ADR model.  
Chapters five through nine represent the second part of the book and 
focus on specific issues relating to environmental conflicts. The topics 
covered include sustainable development, protection of endangered species, 
control of hazardous waste, and biotechnology. These chapters discuss how 
the regulation and legislation in the U.S., U.K., and Australia have developed 
to address these diverse issues.  There is also a chapter relating to 
environmental impact assessment and how legislation requires that 
environmental impact be evaluated and reported.  Each of these chapters 
concludes with a comparison of how litigation and ADR approaches to the 
issue and highlights the positive aspects of ADR.   
In the final chapter, Mr. Christie presents a model for ADR in 
environmental conflicts. It is a step-by-step approach to resolving such a 
conflict. Seeing each step as a distinct phase, which requires a different type 
of dispute resolution, Mr. Christie gives a clear description of the different 
techniques of dispute resolution that will best apply in each phase. In addition 
to the process, he stresses the importance of the dispute resolver having the 
necessary scientific or legal knowledge depending on the type of conflict and 
the stage in the resolution problem.  
Finding Solutions for Environmental Conflicts: Power and Negotiation is a 
well-written book that provides the reader with a clear understanding of the 
issues that generally arise in environmental conflicts, how those issues are 
addressed through litigation and the administrative decision-making process, 
and how using ADR can produce more equitable and long-lasting solutions. 
With a background in ecology, environmental law, and mediation, Edward 
Christie is knowledgeable about the subject of the book and has the expertise 
needed to tie the distinct areas together. The book includes prolific references, 
as well as a table of cases and a table of authorities, which are helpful given 
the detailed discussion of the environmental statutes, regulations, and cases 
from the U.S., U.K., and Australia. Written as a practical guide for 
environmental practitioners, this book can also be useful for students of 
environmental law or ADR, because it provides information on a variety of 
environmental law topics and shows how ADR can be used to address them. 
 
Karin Johnsrud 
Head of Reference 
Fordham Law School Library 
New York, NY USA 
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The Reception of English Law Abroad.   By B.H. McPherson.  Brisbane, 
Australia: Supreme Court of Queensland Library, 2007.  Pp. xlv, 520.  ISBN 
9780975123096.  A$88.00. 
 
In The Reception of English Law Abroad describes the dissemination 
and adoption of English law throughout the British colonial empire.  
According to the author, the charters issued by the crown provided the basis 
for “many of the principles that determine the character of government and 
law in distant places at the present day.”  Likening the law to the English 
language, McPherson states that “transposing the law overseas produced 
different accents and usages involving adjustments and changes to many of its 
rules.” 
The author attempts to establish the basis for the unique 
manifestations of English law among the countries under British rule.  Unlike 
other European imperial powers, which instituted their own national legal 
systems in their territories, McPherson claims that “England did nothing.”  
Although there are many theories for this inaction, McPherson argues that “a 
free Englishman could not be bound by laws made without his consent or that 
of an assembly in which he was represented.”  
In so arguing, McPherson discounts two theories, namely, that 
colonists rejected English law and that English law was “incapable” of export 
outside of the English realm.  He discounts the first theory, noting that the 
American War of Independence was a result of the colonist’s belief that they 
had been denied the rights of Englishmen.  In addressing the second theory, 
McPherson notes the instances of Wales and Ireland, specifically, the Acts of 
Parliament in 1536 and 1543 in the case of Wales and the Case of Tanistry, 
decided in 1608, in the case of Ireland. 
The law as a “natural birthright,” in practice, was transplanted by 
colonists and “later confirmed by legislation.”  Meanwhile, existing local 
legal systems, such as in India, were allowed to coexist with the transplanted 
English law.  Indeed, McPherson describes English law as “peculiarly 
responsive to local circumstances of place and people,” providing a basis for 
the development of local legal systems.  But he also notes a number of 
contributing factors, i.e., land law, government, nationality, individual rights, 
and legislation.  McPherson then dedicates succeeding chapters to each of 
these factors. 
 Land law, as a factor in the reception of English law, was based on 
sovereignty over territory, whether by conquest or cession, as a result of 
conquest or acquisition, or discovery and occupation, in which the crown 
sought to exercise governmental authority over the discovered land.  The goal 
of the English was to establish friendly relations with the indigenous 
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inhabitants and negotiate the purchase of land.  As a result, customary land 
tenures were largely left undisturbed.  One of the issues addressed by 
McPherson is the private purchase of land from native owners, the title of 
which, he notes, was vested in the crown and acted as a burden on that title, 
because only the crown had “power to acquire the land or extinguish . . . 
[native] rights.”  To convey special privileges to English people residing 
abroad, including grants of land, the crown issued charters. 
 The next factor contributing to the spread of English law abroad was 
tied intimately to the first.  Once land was granted to English settlers, the next 
logical step was the governing of those settlers.  Because Parliament did not 
have the staff to supervise colonial possessions, the task fell to the crown.  
Governors were appointed and they initiated legislation to be passed by local, 
representative assemblies, subject to the British Constitution.  Government in 
the colonies was to be exercised to English standards and local laws were not 
to be “repugnant, but . . . agreeable to the laws and statutes of England,” 
including legislation and taxation.  Parliament’s power, generally, to enact 
laws extending abroad to the colonies was limited, based on the narrower 
principle that Englishmen could not be taxed without representation.  
However, the Council for Trade and Plantations exercised administrative 
review of local legislation. 
 Nationality was another factory contributing to the spread of English 
law abroad.  The basis for nationality was feudal in nature, determined by 
birth in a place owing allegiance to the crown.  As such, the subject owed 
loyalty to the crown and, in turn, the crown owed protection and peace 
through its government and laws.  In addition to birth, British nationality 
could be acquired by Acts of Parliament and letters of denisation.  Once 
attached, the status of a British subject was perpetual to him and his 
descendents.  Without British nationality, individuals were prevented from 
owning, transferring, or inheriting land; exercising political rights and holding 
political office; and engaging in trade and shipping. 
 Individual rights, English liberties, or “natural rights of all mankind . . 
. the security of life, liberty and property” were transmitted to the colonies via 
charters, commissions, royal instructions, etc.  In addition, they were re-
enacted in local assemblies or imported under the doctrine of colonial 
birthright.  These rights were recognized in both England, by the Privy 
Council and legal scholars, and her colonies.  However, the unwillingness of 
Parliament to recognize these rights in North America was credited with the 
War for Independence and the loss of the American colonies. 
 Despite the birthright theory of English law, local adoption of 
common law was based, for the most part, on legislation.  English law could 
be imposed in the case of captured or ceded territories (the conquest rule or 
cession rule).  It could be introduced into a colony by an enactment of 
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Parliament. Finally, local legislative bodies could enact reception laws on 
their own initiative, as was most often the case. 
 Even with the granting of independence, imperial statutes and 
legislative instruments often provided for the continuation of English law in 
former colonies.  In addition, as British influence expanded throughout the 
world, English law was introduced.  For example, on the issue of the slavery, 
Great Britain sought to suppress the slave trade in the early 19th century 
internationally, not only in Africa, but also in the Middle East and the 
Western Pacific Ocean.  Commercial ventures and accompanying treaties 
with local political entities introduced English law to Africa, the Near East, 
the Middle East, and the Far East. 
 Generally, where the reception of English law occurred, the whole of 
English law was received.  Exceptions to this rule were territories where other 
legal systems were already in place.  Regarding the character of the law 
received, common law rules, under the birthright principle, were adopted as 
common law.  If common law rules or English statutes were re-enacted 
locally, they were adopted as statutes.  However, statutes adopted under 
general reception laws were adopted as common law. 
 Exception to the reception of English law existed.  These exceptions 
were usually considered to be unsuitable to local conditions.  They were more 
often legislative in nature, since common law was considered a form of 
natural law.  The received law could be expressly repealed; deemed 
inconsistent or repugnant to local customary law, so as to force the received 
law to cease to operate; or revised. 
 In addition to the law itself, judicial administration in the colonies 
was usually based on a court system patterned after the English court system.  
Finally, key to the reception of English law was the educating and training of 
lawyers.  The development of lawyers was limited to learning from 
practitioners or self-study.  Opportunity for either was limited in the colonies.  
Some seeking to study the law returned to England to study at the Inns of 
Court, while others articled, attached themselves to practicing attorneys, or 
“read with leading counsel at the bar.”  However, legal texts were limited 
until the publication of Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Law of England, 
which was widely published and disseminated. 
This book is an excellent historical overview of the basis for the 
reception of English law throughout the world, especially in jurisdictions that 
were at one time subject to English rule.  It is thoroughly documented, not 
only with footnotes throughout the text, but also with a table of cases.  In  
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addition, it is accessible with an index of names and places, as well as a 
subject index.  
 
      Dennis S. Sears 
Associate Director for Legal Research Instruction 
Howard W. Hunter Law Library 
J. Reuben Clark Law School 
Brigham Young University 
Provo, UT USA 
 
 
 
 
The Power and Purpose of International Law, Insights from the Theory and 
Practice of Enforcement. By Mary Ellen O’Connell. Oxford; New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2008.  Pp. 408. ISBN  9780195368949. UK£26.00; 
US$45.00.        
 
 Critics of international law have long claimed that it is not law at all, 
but merely reflects the practice of states acting in their own political or 
economic self-interests.  These "realists" point to inadequate sanctions and 
weak enforcement of international rules as important evidence against the 
idea of international law as binding.  In response, Professor Mary Ellen 
O’Connell’s recent book, The Power and Purpose of International Law, 
Insights from the Theory and Practice of Enforcement, argues that both the 
existence and enforcement of meaningful sanctions demonstrate that states do 
believe that international law is binding, and "[i]nternational law's claim to be 
law is based ultimately on belief." (p. 9)  In support of her thesis, O'Connell 
briefly traces the history of international law theory, enumerates the types of 
sanctions authorized by international law, and marshals substantial evidence 
of enforcement.  In her systematic study of sanctions, unilateral, multilateral, 
international, and domestic, the author builds a convincing case in support of 
the legitimacy of international law. 
 The long-standing view that international law is not truly law 
received renewed attention with the rise of "neoconservative" American 
political thought in the early years of the new millennium and with the 
appearance of The Limits of International Law by Richard L. Goldsmith and 
Eric A. Posner in 2003.3  In that book, the authors argued that international 
"law" mainly described the political practice of states and did not furnish an 
                                                 
3 JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(2003). 
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independent legal basis for constraining state action.  Instead, international 
law simply provided a guide for states in pursuing their political self-interest.  
Weak sanctions and inadequate enforcement of international rules indicated 
that international law did not exert an independent pull on states to comply 
with its tenets. 
 One of the motivations for Professor O’Connell’s book seems to have 
been to respond to the arguments, especially those relating to sanctions and 
enforcement, in the Goldsmith and Posner book.  She devotes a lengthy 
section in her book to refuting systematically the arguments of Goldsmith and 
Posner.  At the outset, O'Connell questions the use of an economic rational-
choice method to evaluate state compliance with international norms.  
Goldsmith and Posner assume for the most part that individuals and states act 
rationally to maximize self-interest, an assumption that O'Connell notes is 
contrary to the "now-massive" literature on cognitive psychology, as well as 
independent evidence that individuals and states may on occasion disregard 
self-interest and act morally or altruistically.  Goldsmith and Posner also 
discount as "cheap talk," statements by international actors that acknowledge 
the binding force of international law.  In their view, when these statements 
come from representatives of governments, international organizations, or 
non-governmental organizations, they presumably amount to little more than 
political rhetoric.  O’Connell criticizes this view as arrogant, because it values 
the authors’ own assumptions about a speaker's beliefs more than the 
speaker's own explanations of the belief.  Finally, she asserts that Goldsmith 
and Posner have omitted and mischaracterized the sources and methods of 
enforcement of international law, and much of her book is devoted to 
addressing those failings. 
 In addition to identifying the specific flaws she sees in Goldsmith and 
Posner's arguments, O'Connell emphasizes their context in the Bush 
administration's post-9/11 attempts to defend the "War on Terror."4  During 
that period, Goldsmith served in the General Counsel's Office of the 
Department of Defense and then in Legal Counsel's Office of the Justice 
Department.  In contrast to other attempts to defend the legality, under 
international law, of Bush-administration practices such as "harsh" 
interrogation techniques and extraordinary rendition, Goldsmith and Posner 
instead challenged the fundamental legitimacy of international law itself.  
Based on their economic analysis of state compliance with international law, 
they concluded that international law was merely descriptive of what states 
would do anyway and that it did not provide an independent basis for binding 
                                                 
4 The so-called "Torture Memos" examined the legality under international law 
of "harsh" interrogation techniques used on suspected terrorists and enemy 
combatants.   
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states against their pursuit of self-interest.  Instead, international law served 
merely as a set of guidelines, or a "special kind of politics,” that states might 
or might not follow.5 
 O'Connell makes much of the dangers of publicly criticizing 
international law at all, contending that any criticism could encourage the 
actions of those who seek to evade external checks on their behavior.  She 
explains her lengthy reply to Goldsmith and Posner's book as an attempt to 
dissuade “U.S. elites" from seizing on their arguments to justify 
noncompliance with international law.  O'Connell’s emphasis, however, is on 
various objections to Goldsmith and Posner's assumptions, arguments, and 
methodology; instead, she affirmatively champions the legitimacy of 
international law by tracing its deep intellectual roots and compiling evidence 
of substantial enforcement practice, with an emphasis on state practice in 
recent decades.  O’Connell's thesis is that the very existence of sanctions for 
the violation of international norms, along with the considerable evidence of 
enforcement over the past decades, demonstrates the legitimacy and impact of 
international law. 
 For the most part, the author builds her argument clearly and 
efficiently.  She begins her discussion of enforcement, however, in an uneven 
chapter on “classical enforcement theory.”  O’Connell’s dilemma was to lay 
the intellectual foundations for her arguments on international law 
enforcement practice without distracting the reader from her larger themes 
with too much detail.  To do justice to a basic intellectual history of 
international law would require substantial explanation, but spending even 
more time on background material than she does might sidetrack a reader 
impatient to get to the crux of her thesis on modern enforcement theory and 
practice.  Although the historical background she provides is instructive, an 
unfamiliar reader might wish for more detail or for clearer links to the 
author’s later points.  The familiar reader, in contrast, may perhaps find this 
introductory overview very basic, in contrast to her later historical treatment 
of specific sanctions and enforcement practice. 
 The chapter recites a chronological history of the thinking of 
international law theorists on enforcement, summarizing basic philosophical 
themes.  Beginning with Christian and Roman ideas about universally 
applicable principles of natural law, “just-war” theory formed the basis for 
early international law rules governing armed conflict.  To have a just war, a 
state could not wage war solely to pursue its own political or commercial self-
interest.  The right to wage war was subject to higher principles; indeed, the 
ruler had to have “a just cause, right intention, and right authority.” (p. 22)  
O'Connell briefly traces the development of just-war theory by summing up 
                                                 
5 GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 202. 
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the ideas of Cicero, Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, the Spanish Scholastics, 
and other just-war thinkers within the space of a few pages. 
 She highlights in more detail the philosophy of Hugo Grotius, the 
seventeenth-century Dutch diplomat, philosopher, and Christian apologist 
whose natural law theories laid the foundations of international law.  In 
Grotius' view, the use of force could be legitimate, but it had to be 
proportional to the wrong, aimed only at the wrongdoer, intended to redress 
the wrong rather than to seek revenge, and ordinarily, serve only as a last 
resort in enforcing the law.  O'Connell points out that most of these ideas still 
apply to the modern rules regulating force in international law.   Despite some 
enduring themes from its natural-law beginnings, however, international law 
theory later evolved in another direction away from rules inherently 
applicable to all people and towards the positivist view in the nineteenth-
century that sovereign states could create law binding on other sovereign 
states only by mutual consent. 
 O'Connell devotes most of her book to showing that sanctions and 
enforcement together manifest the belief of states in the binding force of 
international law.  Sanctions serve a number of functions: identifying legally 
binding rules, coercing violators into compliance, and encouraging respect for 
international law, thus decreasing the need for actual enforcement.  General 
compliance with international law rules demonstrates that states accept the 
legitimacy of those rules. 
 Even though enforcement is an integral part of a legal system, 
O’Connell argues persuasively that judging the nature and legitimacy of a law 
by its enforcement alone is problematic.  In support, she draws convincing 
parallels to areas of domestic law that are poorly or inconsistently enforced, 
but that are regarded nevertheless as legally binding rules: e.g., traffic laws, 
tax laws, domestic violence laws, child support laws, and immigration laws.  
The enforcement of these domestic laws is notoriously lax or inconsistent, but 
no one would dispute their legitimacy as binding law.  In domestic law, the 
mere existence of a sanction for violating the law is more important than 
vigorous and consistent enforcement.  Similarly, O’Connell argues, if a 
sanction is possible for the violation of an international rule, that is evidence 
of the rule’s status as binding law as well.  Perfect enforcement is not 
necessary domestically or internationally as long as the rules are, in fact, 
subject to a possible legal consequence. 
 O’Connell scrutinizes the history and practice of states in applying 
the sanctions available under international law.  "International law has been 
treated as binding by states throughout history: Claims are made on the basis 
of it; lawsuits are filed, and enforcement measures applied." (p. 4) She 
examines armed sanctions and countermeasures, distinguishing among 
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unilateral and multilateral, international and domestic sanctions, and she 
catalogs numerous examples for each type. 
 As the logical baseline for international law enforcement, the United 
Nations Charter in article 2(4) broadly prohibits a state from using force in its 
international relations.  O'Connell emphasizes the significance of that 
provision in establishing positive law in the international community.  
Nevertheless, in the years since the Charter's adoption, the large number of 
inter-state armed conflicts has convinced some scholars that the Charter has 
not constrained states significantly in their use of force.  In this view, if 
international law is based only on the consent of sovereign states, then 
conduct that is inconsistent with a rule could nullify its binding effect.  
O'Connell vigorously challenges the notion that the UN Charter has declined 
in its legal effect and instead finds significance in how states justify their use 
of force: they do not assert that the Charter is not binding, but instead claim 
that they are complying with one of its exceptions.  It is the official positions 
of states that make positive law, O'Connell argues, so even the states that 
violate an international law rule can reinforce its legitimacy by claiming they 
are acting in compliance. 
 The main exception to the Charter's prohibition against armed force is 
self-defense, which O'Connell considers to be a type of international law 
enforcement, given the connection between self-defense and the historic right 
to use war to enforce international rules.  A state may use force in defending 
itself only in response to an armed attack, if it notifies the UN Security 
Council, if the armed force targets the responsible state, and if the defense is 
necessary and proportional.  Thus, the Charter does not authorize preemptive 
self-defense and authorizes unilateral action only until the Security Council 
acts. 
 With regard to collective armed measures, O'Connell vividly contrasts 
the "deeply held understanding in the international community that force 
should only be used as authorized by law" with intense interest by some in 
using force to enforce rules and further policy. (p. 195) The UN Security 
Council retains the authority to use force beyond self-defense, to maintain 
peace and security, but O'Connell asserts the need for greater certainty about 
what international norms should govern Security Council action.  She 
explains the development of peacekeeping operations as the result of 
international interest and desire to respond to conflicts, despite Security 
Council inertia or disagreement.  She does not, however, categorize traditional 
peacekeeping as an enforcement measure, because peacekeeping actions have 
the consent of the warring parties and peacekeepers take no coercive action to 
enforce a ceasefire.  Her accounts of the tragedies in the former Yugoslavia, 
in Somalia, and in Rwanda vividly illustrate the shortcomings of traditional 
peacekeeping actions. 
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 Although the Charter's language is quite broad, article 2(4)'s 
prohibition has been interpreted to mean only armed force.  Other types of 
self-help by states, e.g., economic, political, or physical force not involving 
arms, are considered only countermeasures.  Thus, actions that would 
otherwise violate international law, including low-level force, to respond to a 
prior violation of law no longer constitute "reprisals" under the classic 
definition, but are now deemed to be acceptable countermeasures.  
Countermeasures are now the primary means for states to enforce 
international legal rights, and states use them regularly.  To be a legitimate 
means of enforcement, countermeasures must respond to a legal wrong, be 
proportional to the injury, and be aimed at inducing compliance. (p. 264) 
 Finally, O'Connell discusses the role of courts in interpreting and 
applying international law rules.  Not only are domestic and international 
tribunals important in recognizing the existence of sanctions, but they also 
play an increasing role in applying them.  The adjudications of courts and 
tribunals can authorize actions as legitimate sanctions and not just self-help 
actions of reprisal or revenge.  
 In contrast to the systematic and detailed treatment of her subject in 
the main body of The Power and Purpose of International Law, O’Connell’s 
conclusion section is a bit thin and misses the opportunity to reinforce the 
book’s central themes by pulling together all threads of her argument.  
Nevertheless, the reader comes away from the book with a solid 
understanding of the key ideas relating to the role and effectiveness of 
international law sanctions and ample historical evidence of enforcement 
practice.  O'Connell's treatment of her subject overall is scholarly and 
thorough, and her book effectively answers critics who rely on the absence of 
meaningful legal consequences to question the fundamental legitimacy of 
international law.   
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